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PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROVING ENHANCED
INJURY IN CRASHWORTHINESS CASES: A CLASH
WORTHY OF ANALYSIS
Barry Levenstam and Daryl J. Lapp*
INTRODUCTION
It is well settled that the manufacturer of a defective product may be held
liable for a portion of a plaintiff's injuries in cases where the product itself
played no role in causing the plaintiff's initial accident. This now-familiar
concept is known as the "crashworthiness" or "second collision" doctrine
of product liability. Under this doctrine, the manufacturer may be held liable
for a plaintiff's "enhanced" or aggravated injuries-those injuries over and
above the injuries the plaintiff would have sustained as a result of the initial
accident absent the product defect. Although the conceptual framework of
crashworthiness liability has been in place for two decades, a deep division
persists among courts applying the doctrine. The courts disagree as to the
appropriate burden to be placed on the plaintiff in proving the existence
and extent of enhanced injury.
Part I of this Article describes the crashworthiness or second collision
doctrine of liability, and provides an introduction to the split of authority
with respect to plaintiff's burden of proof. Part II reviews the more rigorous
approach, which requires the plaintiff to offer specific proof that the alleged
product defect was the sole cause of a particular enhanced or aggravated
harm. To meet this burden, the plaintiff must show what injuries would
have resulted from the initial collision absent the alleged defect. The plaintiff
thus bears the full burden of distinguishing between first collision and second
collision injuries.
The opposing view, presented in Part 11, adopts a less rigorous approach,
requiring that the plaintiff show only that the alleged defect was a substantial
factor in causing some aspect of plaintiff's harm. Once the plaintiff has
made this prima facie showing, courts following this approach treat the
product manufacturer as a concurrent tortfeasor jointly liable to the plaintiff
along with the party responsible for causing the initial accident. The man-
ufacturer can limit its liability only if it can show that the plaintiff's injuries
are capable of apportionment between the first collision and second collision.
Where the injury is found to be indivisible, however, the manufacturer
remains jointly liable for the entire extent of the plaintiff's harm.
* Mr. Levenstam is a partner in the Chicago office of Jenner & Block, where he specializes
in product liability law and in appellate litigation. Mr. Lapp is an associate with Jenner &
Block and specializes in product liability law.
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In Part IV, this Article asserts that the more rigorous, sole factor standard
of proving enhanced injury is the better reasoned approach. Requiring that
the plaintiff provide specific proof of enhancement by demonstrating the
extent to which the injuries would have been less severe absent the defect is
more consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of the crashworthiness
doctrine and with the broader themes of product liability law in general.
This approach allows the manufacturer to be held liable for plaintiff's
enhanced injuries, but properly limits that liability to second collision injuries
only. The substantial factor approach too often subjects the manufacturer
to liability for plaintiff's first collision injuries as well.
In addition, the doctrine of apportionment among joint tortfeasors, which
provides the foundation of the less rigorous substantial factor approach, is
doctrinally ill-suited to second collision cases. Placing the burden of injury
apportionment on the manufacturer as a concurrent tortfeasor mistakenly
assumes that the manufacturer is in fact a tortfeasor. The manufacturer in
a second collision case should not be held liable unless the plaintiff first
proves the existence of an enhanced injury. Moreover, the related concept
of indivisible injury is similarly inappropriate in the second collision context.
Holding the manufacturer liable for the entire amount of plaintiff's harm
on the ground that plaintiff's injury is indivisible, and thus incapable of
apportionment, is at odds with the very essence of crashworthiness liability.
The very nature of the plaintiff's claim for relief-an injury over and above
that which would have occurred absent the defect-contemplates an appor-
tionment between injuries caused by the first collision and those caused by
the second collision.
I. THE SECOND COLLISION OR CRASHWORTHINEss DOCTRINE
A. The Concept of Enhanced Injury
The "second collision" or "crashworthiness" doctrine, allows an injured
plaintiff to hold a manufacturer liable for a product defect that did not
1. 'Crashworthiness' means 'the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its
passengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident.'
The term "second collision" usually refers to the collision between a passenger
and an interior part of the vehicle following an impact or collision. The term also
has been applied to ejection cases...in which the second collision is between the
occupant of the car and the ground ....
The two terms tend to be used interchangeably, although some commentators
distinguish between the two....
Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
See also Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Safety Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94, 96 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982)
(defining crashworthiness doctrine).
For a more extensive discussion of crashworthiness and second collision semantics, see Ghiardi,
Second Collision Law-Wisconsin, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985); Harris, Enhanced Injury
Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C.L. REv. 643, 644 (1984); Hoenig, Resolution of
"Crashworthiness" Design Claims, 55 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 633, 633-34 nn.l-3 (1981).
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cause the initial accident, but enhanced or aggravated the plaintiff's injuries.
Since manufacturers are already under a duty to construct vehicles that
are free of latent defects, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916), it follows that the manufacturer's liability for injuries
proximately caused by these defects should not be limited to collisions in
which the defect causes the accident, but should extend to situations in
which the defect caused injuries over and above that which would have
occurred from the accident, but for the defective design.,
Unlike the typical product liability case, the defect in a second collision case
would not have caused any injury without some "independent act" that set
"the injury producing cycle into motion." 3 The source of this original
independent act is irrelevant to recovery if the manner in which the product
was used is deemed "reasonably foreseeable."14
A defective product can lead to the enhancement of a plaintiff's injuries
in several ways: (1) the defect may actually cause the second collision, as
when a defectively designed door latch or seat belt allows an occupant to
be ejected from the vehicle and strike the pavement or another object; (2)
the defect may be in the surfaces or components of the product with which
the occupant collides, such as a dashboard or steering column; or (3) the
structural properties of the product may fail to adequately protect the
plaintiff in a reasonably foreseeable accident, as when a roll bar or roof
support collapses under relatively small forces.' Regardless of the particular
2. Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 245 (citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1968)); Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644
(1973)). See also Barris, 685 F.2d at 99 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The crashworthiness doctrine extends
the manufacturer's liability to situations in which the defect did-not cause the accident or initial
impact, but rather increased the severity of the injury over that which would have occurred
absent the defect .... ) (citations omitted).
3. Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 79-80 (W.D. Mo. 1982). See
also Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (M.D. Pa. 1978). "[A] manufacturer may be
held liable for only those injuries shown to have been caused or enhanced by a defective
condition of a product in the course of or following an initial accident brought about by some
independent cause." Id. As one commentator notes, "in a crashworthiness case, the .manufac-
turer has not caused an injury-producing event, but it is alleged to have failed to take reasonable
steps to prevent the injury producing effects of such an event." Note, Litigating Enhanced
Injury Cases: Complex Issues, Empty Precedents, and Unpredictable Results, 54 U. CN. L.
REv. 1257, 1258 (1986) [hereinafter, Note, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases].
4. Richardson, 552 F. Supp. at 79-80. See also Barris, 685 F.2d at 99. "In crashworthiness
cases, the courts [have] adher[ed] to the rule that strict liability attaches only when a product
is used in a foreseeable manner ... ." Id.
5. Although the crashworthiness claimant "typically is an injured occupant of a vehicle
which has been involved in an accident," nonoccupants, including pedestrians or motorcyclists,
have also made claims of injury enhancement. Hoenig, supra note 1, at 636 n.9 (citations
omitted). Moreover, not all crashworthiness cases involve a "second" collision. Foland, En-
hanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy". Cases, 16
WASHBURN L.J. 600, 606 n.30 (1977) (citing Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.
Tex. 1963) (boy riding bicycle collided with tail fin of automobile); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co.,
163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958) (child walked into pointed hood decoration on
parked car)).
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type of second collision, the manufacturer is liable under the "crashworthi-
ness" doctrine only for the amount of plaintiff's enhanced injury: "the
degree by which a defect aggravates collision injuries beyond those which
would have been sustained as a result of the impact on collision absent the
defect.' '6
B. The Development of the Second Collision Doctrine: Larsen v. General
Motors Corp.
Prior to the development of the second collision doctrine, a plaintiff could
only recover for injuries caused by a manufacturer's product that was
defective for its intended use.7 An automobile manufacturer's duty was
limited to ensuring that its car was reasonably fit for its intended purpose,
namely, transportation.' This principle is best exemplified by Evans v.
General Motors Corp.,9 in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to hold a manufacturer liable for enhanced injuries caused by a
defective design.
In Evans, the plaintiff argued that the defendant's use of an "X" frame
for its automobile, rather than a frame with side rails, caused the death of
her husband when his car was struck from the left side by another auto-
mobile. 0 Plaintiff contended that collisions were foreseeable and, therefore,
the defendant had a duty to make an automobile with side rails in order to
protect occupants during collisions." The court rejected the plaintiff's theory
and held that, although collisions are foreseeable, this foreseeability did not
create a duty on the part of the manufacturer to equip its automobile with
6. Barris, 685 F.2d at 100.
7. See generally Ghiardi, supra note 1, at 2.
8. Id. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (ashtray on dashboard
had defectively jagged edge which inflicted injuries when brakes were suddenly applied); Carpini
v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (because part of the brake
system of bus was located too close to ground it broke off and caused brakes to fail);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (plaintiff injured when
defective wheel fell off automobile causing it to collapse).
9. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). The Seventh Circuit subse-
quently overruled Evans in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977)
(applying Indiana law).
10. 359 F.2d at 823-24. Plaintiff's three-count complaint alleged negligence, breach of
implied warranty, and strict liability:
Plaintiff asserts that defendant was negligent in designing and in failing to test the
design of the automobile; that defendant breached implied warranties that the
automobile was of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for use as an automobile;
that the defendant placed in the stream of commerce an automobile in a dangerous
and defective condition in that it was equipped with an "X" frame lacking side
frame protection, thus proximately causing the fatal injuries to the decedent when
the automobile was involved in a broadside collision, for which the defendant is
strictly liable to plaintiff.
Id. at 824.
II. Id.
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side rail frames. The court reasoned that "[t]he intended purpose of an
automobile does not include its participation in collisions."' The court noted
that although requiring manufacturers to make collision-proof cars was
"desirable," imposing such a duty was a function for the legislature. 3
Justice Kiley dissented from the majority in Evans.'4 He emphasized the
large number of automobile accidents in the United States each year, and
argued that an automobile manufacturer had a duty to design its automobiles
to give "reasonable protection . . . against death and injury from accidents
which are expected and foreseeable yet unavoidable by the purchaser despite
careful use."" Two years after Evans was decided, the Eighth Circuit first
adopted the second collision doctrine in the seminal case of Larsen v. General
Motors Corp. ' 6
In Larsen, the plaintiff was driving a 1963 Corvair when he was involved
in a head-on collision. The impact on the left front corner of the Corvair
caused the steering mechanism to thrust backward into the plaintiff's head."
The plaintiff did not contend that the car's design caused the accident.
Rather, the plaintiff argued that the car's design caused injuries in addition
to, or more severe than, those he otherwise would have received if not for
the defective design." The defendant manufacturer, relying principally on
Evans,'9 argued that it had no duty to design a vehicle that was "safe" or
"safer" during a head-on collision.2 The trial court in Larsen agreed and
further held that the manufacturer had no duty to warn of the alleged latent
or inherently dangerous condition of the vehicle. According to the court, a
duty to warn arises only when a defect "would render the product unsafe
for its intended use." 2' Because the intended use of the product in this case
was "transportation" and not head-on collisions, General Motors had no
12. Id. at 825. In holding that the foreseeability of collisions did not create additional duties
upon the automobile manufacturer, the court made the following analogy: "the defendant also
knows that its automobiles may be driven into bodies of water, but it is not suggested that the
defendant has a duty to equip them with pontoons." Id.
13. Id. at 824. As one commentator has noted, the argument that the imposition of additional
duties upon a manufacturer is a legislative responsibility was one of the principal public policy
arguments advanced against the second collision doctrine. Ghiardi, supra note 1, at 4. Other
arguments included: "(1) the possibility of a large flood of litigation against automobile
manufacturers; (2) the difficulty that juries would have in properly evaluating the complex
economic engineering data that would be presented." Id.
14. 359 F.2d at 825 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 827 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
16. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
17. Id. at 496-97.
18. Id. at 497.
19. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
20. 391 F.2d at 497.
21. Id. at 498. "The District Court . . . rendered summary judgment in favor of General
Motors on the basis that there was no common law duty on the manufacturer 'to make a
vehicle which would protect the plaintiff from injury in the event of a head on collision' and
dismissed the complaint." Id. at 497.
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duty to warn of allegedly defective design of the steering assembly. 2
The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected this view of "intended use" as
"much too narrow and unrealistic. ' 23 The court concluded:
While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each
other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use
will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts. No rational basis
exists for limiting recovery to situations where the defect in design or
manufacturer was the causative factor of the accident, as the accident and
the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called "second collision" of
the passenger with the interior part of the automobile, all are foreseeable.2
The court held that the manufacturer could not be held liable for the full
extent of the plaintiff's injuries if the defect did not cause the initial
accident.2 5 However, if the defective design enhanced or aggravated the
plaintiff's injuries, "the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of
the damages or injury caused by the defective design over and above the
damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the
impact or collision absent the defective design.'"'2
The Fourth Circuit in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,2 7 also rec-
ognized the second collision doctrine, and refined the Larsen analysis by
limiting the role of foreseeability by defining the parameters of the manu-
facturer's duty. The Dreisonstok court emphasized that the foreseeability of
automobile collisions did not "create a duty on the part of the manufacturer
to design its car to withstand such collisions under any circumstances. "2
The Dreisenstok court interpreted Larsen's articulation of the manufacturer's
duty as whether the design embodied an 'unreasonable risk of injury in
the event of a collision,' not foreseeability of collision." 29 The concept of
"unreasonable risk" necessarily involves a balancing of factors: the likeli-
hood of harm; the gravity of harm if it occurs; the burden of preventing
the harm and; the utility and purpose of the particular type of vehicle
involved. 30
22. Id.
23. Id. at 502.
24. Id. "The effect of the crashworthiness doctrine is that a manufacturer has a legal duty
to design and manufacture its product to be reasonably crashworthy .... In terms of strict
product liability, this means that a manufacturer has to include accidents among the 'intended'
uses of its product." Barris, 685 F.2d at 100 (citing Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d
Cir. 1976); Olson v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
25. Id. at 503.
26. Id.
27. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
28. Id. at 1070 (emphasis in original). The court stated, "Foreseeability, it has been many
times repeated, is not to be equated with duty; it is . . . one factor, albeit an important one,
to be weighed in determining the issue of duty." Id. See also Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp.
105, 108 (D.N.J. 1973) (because foreseeability is but one of several factors determinative of
duty, "the scope of duty is not coextensive with foreseeability").
29. Id. at 1070 (quoting Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502).
30. Id.
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Most jurisdictions now have adopted the Larsen-Dreisonstok view of a
manufacturer's liability for enhanced injuries suffered in a second collision.3
One commentator has reported that "[only one state court has followed
Evans since Dreisonstok was decided, and there is now undisputed precedent
adopting Evans in only two states32 while thirty-five states and the District
of Columbia follow Larsen."33
31. See Harris, supra note 1, at 644; Ropiequet, Current Issues Under the 'Second Collision'
Doctrine, For The Def., Oct. 1983, at 12, 14; Note, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases, supra
note 3, at 1257. Although Larsen itself was a negligence case, "[in the wake of Larsen, courts
have recognized crashworthiness to be actionable in negligence, strict liability and breach of
warranty." Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779, 782 (Ct. App. 1983)
(citing Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or Distributor of Motor Vehicle for Defect
Which Merely Enhances Injury From Accident Otherwise Caused, 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972)).
32. Ropiequet, supra note 31, at 14. The two states adopting Evans are Mississippi, in
Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So.2d 568 (Miss. 1969); and West Virginia, in McClung
v. Ford Motor Co., 335 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W.Va. 1971), qff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
33. Ropiequet, supra note 31, at 14. States following Larson are: California-Horn v.
General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976); Colorado-
Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978); District of Columbia-Knippen v.
Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Florida-Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327
So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Georgia-Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165
S.E.2d 734 (1968); Idaho-Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 533 P.2d 1306
(1976); Illinois-Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1978); Indiana-Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); Iowa-Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.,
454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Wernimont v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137
(Iowa Ct. App. 1981); Kansas-Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971);
Kentucky-Wooten v. White Truck, 514 F.2d 634, (5th Cir. 1975); Louisiana-Perez v. Ford
Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974); Maryland-Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272
Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Massachusetts-Smith v. Ariens Co., 374 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d
954 (1978); Michigan-Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 60Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d
413 (1975); Minnesota-Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1979);
Missouri-Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976);
Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Montana-Brandenburger v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Nebraska-Friedrich
v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974); New Jersey-Huddell v. Levin, 395 F.
Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); New Mexico-
Meil v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1981); New York-Bolm v. Triumph
Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); North Dakota-Johnson v.
American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Ohio-Leichthamer v. American Motors
Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981); Oklahoma-Lee v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 688 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1984); Oregon-McMullen v. Volkswagen of Am., 274 Or. 83, 545
P.2d 117 (1976); Pennsylvana-Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Rhode Island-Turcott v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); South Carolina-
Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); South Dakota-Engberg v. Ford
Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. Smith,
278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979); Tennessee-Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn.
1973); Texas-Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Virgi-
nia-Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Washington-
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974); Wisconsin-
Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975); and Wyoming-Chrysler Corp.
v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978).
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C. Plaintiff's Burden of Proof. The Split in Authority
Jurisdictions that recognize the second collision doctrine universally concur
in two important corollaries of that doctrine. First, because the allegedly
defective product played no role in causing the plaintiff's initial accident,
the manufacturer can be held liable only for enhanced or aggravated injuries
that would not have occurred absent the alleged defect in the product, and
cannot be held liable for injuries attributable to the initial collision. Second,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the alleged defect caused the
enhanced injuries.34 The courts have split rather dramatically, however, over
the degree of proof a plaintiff is required to provide to meet this burden.
At its most basic level, the argument is whether the plaintiff should be
required to show that the alleged design defect is the sole cause of plaintiff's
enhanced injury, or merely a substantial factor in causing the aggravated
harm. 3"
34. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The decisions
[on second collision liability] are in agreement that the manufacturer is liable only for the
enhanced injuries, and that a plaintiff must prove some causation between the alleged defect
and the enhanced injuries."); Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F.Supp. 73, 80 (W.D.
Mo. 1982) ("The courts have uniformly held in second collision cases that the plaintiff also
bears the burden of proving causation-that the manufacturer's defective product enhanced the
injuries sustained in the accident."); Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of Proof of
Injuries Resulting from "Second Collision," 9 A.L.R.4th 494, 497 (1981) (collecting cases).
35. The Calazzo court described the split in authority this way:
One group of decisions ... requires a plaintiff to distinguish between those injuries
that are attributable to the accident and those that are attributable to the design
defect....
Other jurisdictions have ruled that a plaintiff need not prove the nature and extent
of the enhanced injuries .... but need only offer '[slome evidence of enhancement'
to present a jury issue.
647 F.2d at 249 (quoting Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d
490, 501 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom General Motors Corp. v.
Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980) (emphasis in original)).
"Reduced to simplicity, the issue is whether a plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer's
defective product was the sole factor or a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's enhanced
injuries." Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 81 (W.D. Mo. 1982). See
also Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Oki. 1984); Note, Litigating
Enhanced Injury Cases, supra note 3, at 1264-69.
Although noting that there are two main approaches to plaintiff's burden of proof, one
commentator has described several levels of proof that have been applied when the injury to
plaintiff is indivisible. The range among the levels of proof is as follows, listed in order of
difficulty:
1. Once plaintiff proves the defect was a contributing (not substantial) factor
in producing plaintiff's indivisible injuries, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant.
2. The plaintiff must prove some evidence of enhancement of injury.
3. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's product was a substantial factor
in producing plaintiff's injuries.
4. The plaintiff must prove the defect caused or enhanced his injuries.
5. The plaintiff must prove not only which injuries were caused by the defect,
[Vol. 38:55
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Under the sole factor approach the plaintiff must prove with some degree
of particularity the extent of the injuries that resulted from the initial
collision. The plaintiff thus bears the full burden of distinguishing between
first collision and second collision injuries. Without such proof, the plaintiff
cannot establish that the design has caused any enhancement or aggravation
of injuries.36
The opposing line of authority rejects this position as imposing too harsh
a burden on the plaintiff. The substantial factor approach merely requires
the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of enhancement. If the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the alleged defect played a substantial factor in causing
some injuries, the issue of second collision liability may go to the jury. The
burden shifts to the manufacturer to apportion the injuries between those
resulting from the initial collision and those caused by the product's design
in the second collision."1 Where the injury is said to be indivisible, however,
this apportionment is deemed neither possible nor appropriate, and the
manufacturer, whose product played no role in the initial accident, is held
jointly liable for the entire extent of the plaintiff's harm.3"
II. PRODUCT DEFECT AS THE SOLE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S ENHANCED
INJURY
A. The Sole Factor Approach: Huddell v. Levin
The leading case adopting the "sole cause" approach is Huddell v. Levin.3 9
Huddell was driving his 1970 Chevrolet Nova across a bridge when his car
ran out of gas. He brought the car to a full stop in the left-most lane of
traffic, where it was struck from behind by a Chrysler sedan traveling between
50 and 60 miles per hour. The collision caused Huddell's head to strike the
head restraint on the driver's seat at a speed of ten miles per hour. This
blow resulted in a fractured skull and extensive brain damage which led to
Huddell's death one day after the accident. Other than the fatal blow against
the head restraint, Huddell suffered only minor injuries. 40
At trial, the plaintiff contended that Huddell's death resulted from a
defect in the design of the head restraint. Specifically, the plaintiff argued
that a "relatively sharp edge of unyielding metal allowed for excessive
concentration of forces against the rear of the skull."' 4' The jury found for
but what injuries he would have received absent the defect, and what injuries
he would have received by his suggested alternative design.
Norman, The Crashworthiness Case, 17 TRiAL LAW. Q. 16(4) at 31 (1986).
36. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
39. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 732.
41. Id. at 735 (quoting from Appellee's brief at 8). Mrs. Huddell, suing in her representative
capacity, alleged that the defectively designed head restraint failed to provide adequate protection
against a rear-end collision. Id. at 732.
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the plaintiff and returned a verdict of over $2,000,000 against the manufac-
turer of the car.4 2
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded
for a new trial.43 The court rejected the district court's conclusion that the
plaintiff's burden was merely to prove that the design of the head restraint
was a "substantial factor" in causing Huddell's death." The Third Circuit
held that, in a second collision case, the plaintiff is required to provide "a
highly refined and almost invariably difficult" proof of three necessary
elements. 45 First, the plaintiff must "offer proof of an alternative, safer
design, practicable under the circumstances." 46 Second, the plaintiff must
offer proof of the extent of the injuries, if any, that he would have suffered
had the alternative design been used. 47 Finally, "as a corollary to the second
aspect of proof," the plaintiff must "offer some method of establishing the
extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design." 4
The Third Circuit found that the plaintiff in Huddell had failed to satisfy
the second and third elements of her prima facie case. 49 Plaintiff's experts
had testified that the accident would have been "survivable" if the head
restraint had been designed to provide for distribution of the collision forces
over a greater area of the body than just one portion of the skull.5 0 The
Court held that this proof of enhancement was insufficient because the term
"survivable" was not specifically defined, and there was no testimony to
establish what Dr. Huddell's injuries would have been if he had survived
42. Id. at 731.
43. Id. at 744.
44. 395 F. Supp. 64, 77 (D.N.J. 1975).
45. 537 F.2d at 737.
46. Id.
47. Id. In requiring plaintiff to offer proof of what injuries would have occurred if the
alternative design had been used, the court in Huddell approved the reasoning of the district
court in Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973). In Yetter, the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death suit based on the second collision doctrine, asserting that the decedent's death
could have been prevented by the installation of a collapsible or non-rigid steering wheel
assembly. Id. at 108. Plaintiff's proof was held insufficient because all of plaintiff's experts
called to testify on the injury enhancement issue "were not physicians but were engineers." Id.
at 109.
Particularly when we are dealing with a claim for enhanced injuries, it is absolutely
necessary that the jury be presented with some evidence as to the extent of injuries,
if any, which would have been suffered ... had the plaintiff's hypothetical design
been installed .... The jury, without such testimony, is left only to speculate as to
the injuries [the decedent] would have suffered if the energy-absorbing steering
column had, in fact, been installed, and this could only have been established by
competent medical testimony as to the forces which the human body could withstand
without injury, or without injury to the extent suffered by [the decedent].
Id. at 109.
48. 537 F.2d at 738.
49. Id. The court noted that "[hlaving failed to establish satisfactorily the second aspect,
a plaintiff necessarily must fail with regard to the third." Id.
50. Id.
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the crash.5 ' Absent such proof, the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the second
element of her prima facie case: the extent of injuries caused by the allegedly
defective head restraint." There was, therefore, no basis upon which the
jury could have assessed liability against the manufacturer for Huddell's
death under the second collision doctrine. 3
Judge Rosenn concurred with the majority's holding that the case should
be remanded to allow the plaintiff to prove enhancement. Judge Rosenn
also adopted the first element of the majority's three-part standard of proof-
the requirement of proof of a safer alternative design.' However, he noted
that under some circumstances, the second and third elements of proof
would be "unreasonably burdensome" to an innocent plaintiff. Judge Ro-
senn argued that in those situations the burden of apportioning between the
first and second collision injuries should be placed upon the defendants."
He argued that where the party who caused the initial accident and the
vehicle's manufacturer "have combined contemporaneously to cause the
[plaintiff's] injuries," they can be treated as concurrent tortfeasors in ac-
cordance with the principles embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 433B(2).16 Under those principles, a defendant seeking to limit his liability
on the ground that the damages are capable of apportionment-i.e., an
automobile manufacturer claiming that it is liable only for the separable
amount of enhanced injury-has the burden of apportioning the harm."
In response to Justice Rosenn, the majority in Huddell rejected "the legal
lore surrounding concurrent tortfeasor actions" as inapplicable to second
51. Id. For example, although one of plaintiff's medical experts testified that Dr. Huddell
suffered no injury to vital organs other than the brain during the accident:
this ignored the possibility that injury to those organs might have been more severe
if the great forces of the collision had been more widely distributed over the head
and body by an alternative head restraint design. It was not established whether
the hypothetical victim of the survivable crash would have sustained no injuries,
temporary injuries, permanent but insignificant injuries, extensive and permanent
injuries, or possibly, paraplegia or quadriplegia. Id.
52. Id. The court concluded that "[w]ithout proof to establish what injuries would have
resulted from a non-defective head restraint, the plaintiff could not and did not establish what
injuries resulted from the alleged defect in the head restraint." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 744 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Rosenn, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 744, 745 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Justice Rosenn cited the "seminal case of
Summers v. Tice in which the principle of concurrent tortfeasors was first enunciated." Id. at
745 (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)).
57. Id. at 745-46 (Rosenn, J., concurring):
The underlying rationale of the courts has been that justice is better served by
allowing an innocent plaintiff to recover his entire damages from independent and
concurrent wrongdoers, when he cannot reasonably apportion his damages, -than
by protecting a proven wrongdoer from possible overpayment. The burden is placed
squarely upon the defendant to limit his liability in such circumstances.
Id. at 746 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
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collision or enhanced injury cases.58 Concurrent tortfeasor principles are
inapposite, the court reasoned, because the alleged tortfeasors in a second
collision case-the party responsible for the initial collision and the manu-
facturer whose product allegedly has caused or aggravated plaintiff's injury-
have not combined contemporaneously or concurrently to cause the injuries.5 9
The court concluded that because the theory of liability against the manu-
facturer in a second collision case is one of enhanced injury, analogies "to
concurrent actions combining to cause a single impact are simply not appli-
cable."60
B. Cases Following the Huddell Approach
The standard announced in Huddell, which requires a plaintiff to prove
that the alleged defect was the sole cause of plaintiff's enhanced injury, has
been expressly adopted in a number of jurisdictions.61 In Caiazzo v. Volks-
wagenwerk, A.G., 62 the Second Circuit expressly adopted Huddell after an
extensive analysis of the two lines of cases concerning the burden of proof
of enhanced or aggravated injuries. 3 In Caiazzo, the plaintiffs' Volkswagen
58. Id. at 738.
59. "'Second collision' cases do not implicate 'clearly established double fault' for the same
occurrence." Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. (emphasis in original).
61. Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Safety Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 1982)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 843 (3d Cir.)
(North Carolina law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981) (New York law); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950,
958-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey law), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Stonehocker v.
General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1978) (South Carolina law); Jeng v. Witters,
452 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Duran v.
General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779, 787 (Ct. App. 1983); Wernimont v.
International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa Cir. App. 1981).
62. 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York law).
63. Id. at 250. In its review, the Caiazzo court attempted to identify a consistent factual
distinction between the two lines of cases. The court concluded that "[t]hose cases that place
the burden of apportionment on the manufacturer either involve second collision injuries that
are clearly distinguishable from those suffered during the initial collision ... or involve a
wrongful death action," while "[decisions that place the burden of proving the nature and
extent of the injuries on the plaintiff tend to involve injuries such as broken bones, which are
alleged to have been made more severe because of the defect." Id. at n.16.
Upon closer examination, however, this "factual distinction" between the two lines of cases
quickly breaks down. Huddell, for example, the leading case for the position that plaintiff
should bear the burden of apportionment, involved a wrongful death claim. 537 F.2d at 726.
Conversely, Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 646 P.2d 1020 (Ct. App. 1982),
which placed the burden of apportionment on the manufacturer, involved non-fatal injuries
alleged to have been made more severe because of the product defect. Id. at 251, 646 P.2d at
1022.
The "factual distinction" is further controverted by the quadriplegia and paraplegia cases
which appear on both sides of the apportionment debate. Compare Shipp v. General Motors
Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985) (burden on manufacturer) and Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor
Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984) (burden on manufacturer), with Duran v. General
Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983) (burden on plaintiff).
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minibus was struck from behind by a car travelling between 50 and 65 miles
per hour."4 Neither of the plaintiffs was wearing a seat belt; both were
ejected from the van during the crash and suffered severe injuries.65 The
plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were enhanced principally by a defective
door latch design which caused the doors to open during the collision,
resulting in their ejection from the van."
The trial court held that the plaintiffs were only required to prove that
the defective door latch was a substantial factor in causing the enhancement
of their injuries. 67 Under this approach, the manufacturer had the burden
of apportionment in seeking to limit its liability to the enhanced injury
caused by its defective product. Volkswagen thus had the burden of segre-
gating the injuries between those caused by the initial collision, those caused
by the alleged design defect in the door latch, and those caused by the
plaintiffs' failure to use their seat belts. 68
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's use of the
substantial factor approach as placing "too heavy a burden on the manu-
facturer and contradict[ing] the theoretical underpinnings of the second
collision doctrine."69 The court concluded that placing the burden of ap-
portioning between the collision injuries and the enhanced injuries on the
manufacturer forces the manufacturer to show a "plethora of hypothetical
and speculative possibilities."' ° In addition, the nature of proof under the
substantial factor approach allows the jury to engage in undue speculation. 7'
The court noted that such speculation could tempt a jury to assign liability
on the basis of which party would best be able to afford the damages,
namely, the manufacturer. 2 The court held that requiring the plaintiff to
prove the extent of the enhanced injuries in order to recover from the
manufacturer provided a "simpler, fairer, and conceptually more sound
approach" to the problem.73
Similarly, in Duran v. General Motors Corp.,74 the New Mexico appellate
court also relied on the theoretical basis of second collision liability to
conclude that Huddell articulated the proper burden of proof. In Duran,
64. 647 F.2d at 243.
65. Id. at 243-44.
66. Id. at 244.
67. Id. at 246 (quoting Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 601 (E.D.N.Y.
1979)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 250-51.
72. Id. The court noted that the substantial factor approach-which requires proof merely
of the fact of enhancement- "permits a jury to engage in undue speculation as to the causes
of various injuries and gives a jury dangerous latitude in assigning responsibility to the defendant
who appears most able to pay a plaintiff's award." Id.
73. Id. at 244.
74. 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983).
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the plaintiff was one of a group of high school cheerleaders returning from
a football game in a Chevrolet van owned by the school district. The van
encountered heavy rain and the driver lost control as it hydroplaned. The
van struck a grassy median and rolled over. The plaintiff, who was seated
in the left rear of the van, was injured when the roof and rear door frame
were pushed inward and downward into the passenger area by the impact
during the rollover." The plaintiff's head struck the door frame, or "header,"
resulting in the dislocation of a cervical disc and paralysis from the chest
own.
7 6
Noting the similarity between second collision cases and cases involving
proof of aggravation of a pre-existing injury,7 the Court adopted the sole
factor approach in proving proximate cause. 78 The plaintiff did not object
to the Huddell standard, but rather contended that she had met the elements
of proof prescribed in Huddell.79 Plaintiff's expert testified that if the
weldings had not failed and the roof had not buckled in such a way as to
cause intrusion of the rear header into the car as a sharp object, the plaintiff,
like the girl next to her, would have hit her head on the roof and sustained
a neck sprain rather than a dislocation °
The court concluded, however, that this evidence-the only evidence pre-
sented to show enhanced injury-was insufficient to establish causation.,'
The court found two "insurmountable difficulties" with the testimony of
the plaintiff's experts. First, her experts failed to estimate how much the
header would have intruded absent the alleged defects. s2 This was a crucial
point to establish, stated the court, because the manufacturer could not be
held liable for injuries caused by the initial impact. 3 Second, the medical
expert also failed to explain how the plaintiff would have sustained the same
injury as the girl with the sprained neck. The court reasoned that such a
conclusion was unfounded without specific evidence of how far and in what
75. Id. at 743, 688 P.2d at 780.
76. Id. at 743-44, 688 P.2d at 780-81.
77. The Court noted that in the latter cases defendant is liable only for the aggravation or
acceleration of plaintiff's injuries-not for the pre-existing condition-and that plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the extent of the aggravation with reasonable certainty. Id. at 750, 688
P.2d at 787 (citing Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Hebenstreit v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 65 N.M. 301, 336 P.2d 1057 (1959)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 752, 688 P.2d at 789.
81. Id.
82. The court stressed: "Both of plaintiff's experts testified that as a result of the failure
of the welding and the absence of the trim retainers, the rear door header intruded farther into
the passenger compartment than it would have without those defects. Neither, however, could
estimate how much more." Id. at 750, 688 P.2d at 787.
83. Id. at 752, 688 P.2d at 789 (emphasis in original). "[The defendants were] only liable,
if at all, for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defects over and above the
damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the van impacting on its
roof without those defects." Id. (emphasis in original).
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direction the header would have intruded absent the alleged defects. 8' The
court held that the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant,
stating "the jury could have no basis other than conjecture, surmise or
speculation upon which to consider whether [the plaintiff's] injury occurred
as a result of the added intrusion of the rear header or as a result of the
unavoidable intrusion.'""
The foregoing cases expressly adopted the Huddell standard and applied
it to the plaintiff's offer of proof." Additionally, a number of other courts
have embraced the Huddell standard before being presented with an oppor-
tunity to apply it to the facts of the case. 7 Still other courts have applied a
rule that is similar to the Huddell formulation.88
III. PRODUCT DEFECT AS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN CAUSING PLAINTI's
ENHANCED INJURY
A number of courts have rejected the Huddell standard of proof of
proximate cause in second collision cases as imposing too stiff a burden on
84. Id. at 752-53, 688 P.2d 789-90.
85. Id. at 753, 688 P.2d at 790. In Jeng v. Witters, the trial court also decided the issue of
proximate cause based upon the Huddell analysis. 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1360-61 (M.D. Pa. 1978),
aff'd without opinion, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979). In that case, plaintiffs were passengers in
the rear seat of a Buick sedan which was crossing a four-lane highway when it was struck by
another car. Id. at 1353-54. The rear door of the vehicle "flew open" and both plaintiffs were
thrown out of the car onto the highway. Id. at 1353. Plaintiffs sued the car's manufacturer,
claiming that their injuries were enhanced by a defective door latch. Id. Mr. Jeng apparently
suffered only "abrasions and cuts" in the accident, while Mrs. Jeng was killed. Id. at 1362-
63. At trial, the jury found that the door latch was not defective; plaintiffs moved for a
judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial. Id. at 1354. The court went on to review plaintiffs'
"actual proof on the augmentation of injuries by reason of the allegedly defective door," and
found it insufficient to establish liability. Id. Plaintiffs' engineering expert testified-and General
Motors' expert admitted on cross-examination-that it is more dangerous to be ejected from a
vehicle than to remain inside it during the accident. Id. at 1361-62. Plaintiffs' medical expert,
however, was not able to state conclusively whether plaintiffs would have sustained the same
or similar. injuries if they had not been ejected from the car. Id. at 1362. Thus the court held
that plaintiffs had "failed to submit adequate evidence on which a jury could decide what
injuries would have resulted had the alleged alternative safer [door latch] design been used and
failed to establish the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the design defect." Id.
86. See also Wernimont v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 140-44 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1981) (plaintiff offered insufficient proof to satisfy recently adopted Huddell standard).
87. In Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978), the plaintiff in
a rollover case sued for enhanced injuries allegedly resulting from the car manufacturer's
negligent design of the roof and negligent manufacture of the windshield. Id. at 153. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding reversible error
in the district court's refusal to admit the manufacturer's compliance with a subsequently
enacted safety standard as evidence of due care. Id. at 156-57. Citing Huddell, the court stated
that on retrial defendant would be entitled to an instruction on enhanced injury, and that "the
burden is on the plaintiff either to establish that he would have suffered no injury or the extent
of the injury he would have suffered, had the vehicle been properly designed." Id. at 158
(citing Huddell, 537 F.2d 726, 737-39).
88. See Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying
Colorado law); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 774 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying
Georgia law); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1287-88 (Okla. 1984); Ropiequet,
supra note 31, at 21 n.19.
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the plaintiff.8 9 These courts typically have rejected the Huddell formulation
on the following grounds: that Huddell is at odds with the "orthodox"
doctrines of joint liability of concurrent tortfeasors, and that Huddell re-
quires the plaintiff to apportion, between the initial and second collisions,
injuries that often are indivisible. Courts that follow the less rigorous "sub-
stantial factor" approach to causation in second collision cases hold that
once the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of enhancement, i.e., that
the defect is a substantial factor in causing the enhanced injury, a jury
question is presented and the burden shifts to the defendant. The defendant
has the burden of apportioning the injuries between those resulting from the
initial collision and those caused by the alleged defect in the second collision.
If the injury is deemed to be indivisible, the manufacturer is held liable for
the entire amount of plaintiff's harm.
The leading case for the substantial factor approach is the Tenth Circuit's
decision two years after Huddell, Fox v. Ford Motor Co.9 The Fox Court
sounded both the concurrent tortfeasor and the indivisible injury themes in
its approach to proximate causation. In Fox, two couples were traveling in
a 1970 Ford Thunderbird along an icy highway. All four passengers were
wearing seat belts. A pickup truck traveling in the opposite direction crossed
over the center line and struck the Thunderbird nearly head-on.9' Although
both of the husbands, in the front seats, survived the accident, their wives
suffered extensive abdominal injuries and fractured spines, and were killed.9
The plaintiffs' experts testified that the wives' injuries were more severe
than those that would have occurred had the rear seat belts been equipped
with shoulder belts, not merely lap belts. 93 The manufacturer's experts
countered with conclusions that the rear seat belts were properly positioned,
that the angle of the belts did not influence the extent of the injuries, and
89. See Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1982); Richardson v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 83-84 (W.D. Mo. 1982); General Motors Corp. v.
Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1190 (Ala. 1985); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249,
646 P.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Ct. App. 1982); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 41 Md.
App. 579, 590-94, 398 A.2d 490, 498-500 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1288-89 (Okla. 1984); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121
Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2, 10-11 (1984); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1130-
31 (Wyo. 1978).
90. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law).
91. Id. at 777.
92. Id. at 778.
93. The complaint is that the hip belts approached being on a horizontal plane rather
than on a vertical one which would hold the hips down. The result was that the
entire force of the accident was absorbed by the abdomen, a part of the body which
is particularly vulnerable. The theory was that if the seat belts had been placed so
as to hold the hips down, there would have been preventive force exerted designed
to prevent injuries to the lower body. The absence of shoulder belts subjects the
upper body to the risk of injury.
Id. at 777.
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that the severe injuries were attributable to the high speed of the impact.'
The trial court entered jury verdicts for the two plaintiffs' estates in the
amounts of $350,000 and $300,000. 91
Relying on Huddell v. Levin, Ford argued on appeal that the trial court
erred by failing to instruct the jury that the defendant could be held liable
only for that portion of damages which "proximately resulted" from the
design defects. 96 Ford argued that to prove proximate causation of enhanced
injuries, "plaintiffs were required to prove with specificity the injuries which
flowed specifically from its deficiencies.' '9
The Tenth Circuit agreed in principle with Ford's argument that the
plaintiffs had the burden of proving that injuries were caused by the allegedly
defective design of the rear belts. The manufacturer's liability should be
limited to those injuries that were the proximate result of the defect." The
court, however, declined to follow the Third Circuit's approach to causation
in Huddell. The Fox court rejected Huddell's requirement that the plaintiff
prove what injuries would have occurred as a result of the initial collision
absent the alleged defect, stating this approach posed "an impossible question
to answer." 9
The Fox court asserted that Huddell "refused to follow the orthodox
doctrine of joint liability of concurrent tortfeasors for injuries which flow
from their concurring in one impact."' The court rejected the Third Cir-
cuit's conclusion that concurrent tortfeasor principles are inapplicable in the
second collision context. The court noted that, under concurrent tortfeasor
principles, where two parties each contribute in causing injury and it is not
reasonably possible to distinguish the amount of damage caused by the
separate acts, each party can be held liable for the entire extent of the
harm. 0' Thus, although the initial accident in Fox was caused by the pickup
94. Id.
95. Id. at 777.
96. Id. at 786-87.
97. Id. at 787.
98. Id. (citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); Knippen
v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259
(8th Cir), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st
Cir. 1974); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969)).
99. 575 F.2d at 788. The court noted that "[t]he thesis of [Huddel] was that collision cases
are to be treated differently from other liability or negligence cases as far as the specificity of
proof is concerned." Id.
100. Id. "We fail to see any difference between this type of case and ... other casels) in
which two parties, one passive, the other active, cooperate in the production of an injury."
Id. See also General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1190 (Ala. 1958) "Like the
Fox court, this Court sees no reason to dismantle our longstanding rules of concurrent tortfeasor
liability merely because 'crashworthiness' claims do not present, as the Huddell court called it,
'an orthodox strict liability case."' Id.
101. "In the average tort case involving multiple causes, each of which is a substantial factor
in bringing about an injury incapable of logical division, every negligent party is charged with
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truck that crossed over the center line, Ford was jointly and severally liable
as a concurrent tortfeasor for the entire amount of the harm because the
plaintiffs had shown that the design of the seats and seat belts was a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries.1°2 Although concurrent
tortfeasors may be able to apportion damages between themselves "if there
are distinct harms or a reasonable basis for determining the causes of
injury,"'0 3 the Fox court noted that apportionment is neither appropriate
nor possible where the injury suffered is not divisible."3 4 The court then held
that the injury suffered in the present case, death, was indivisible. 05 Ac-
liability for the entire damage." Foland, supra note 5, at 609 (citing Restatement (Second)
Torts § 433A (1965), comment on subsec. 2).
Section 433A of the Restatement provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause
to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.
Section 433B(2) provides:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about
harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on
the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of
proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
The indivisibility of an injury resulting in the imposition of joint or concurrent tortfeasor
liability has been described as follows:
[T]he identity of a cause of action against each of two or more defendants; the
existence of a common, or like, duty; whether the same evidence will support an
action against each; the single indivisible nature of the injury to the plaintiffs;
identity of the facts at the time, place or result; whether the injury is direct and
immediate, rather than consequential; responsibility of the defendants for the same
injuria, as distinguished from the same damnum.
W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 46, at n.2 (5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted).
For more extensive discussion of joint or concurrent tortfeasor liability and its application
to second collision cases, see Ball, A Reexamination of Joint And Several Liability Under A
Comparative Negligence System, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 891, 898 (1987); Ghiardi, supra note 1,
at 4-5; Wade, Multiple Tortfeasor Liability in Products Liability Suits, 55 Miss. L.J. 683 (1985);
Comment, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475,
492-97 (1977).
102. Fox, 575 F.2d at 787.
103. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 423A). See, e.g., Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Under established tort principles even though two
or more tortfeasors act consecutively but independently, they still may be only severally liable
if it can be shown that there exists a clearly separable harm so that a reasonable division of
damage can be made.").
104. 575 F.2d at 787. See General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1189 (Ala.
1985) ("Fox, following the dictates of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 433, 433A and
433B (1965), holds that if plaintiff's injuries are indivisible, the manufacturer and striking driver
are jointly and severally liable as concurrent tortfeasors.") (citations omitted).
105. "[D]eath is a different matter. It is not a divisible injury in which apportionment is
either appropriate or possible." Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, comment i;
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF rTa LAW OF TORTS 315 (4th ed. 1971)). Dean Prosser stated that
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cordingly, the court concluded that, as a matter of law, there was no basis
on which Ford could apportion plaintiffs' injuries between those resulting
from the initial and second collisions, and thus limit its liability.
In short, under the approach taken in Fox, if the plaintiff can make a
prima facie showing that a defect in the manufacturer's product was a
substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury, the manufacturer acquires the
status of a concurrent tortfeasor. The burden then shifts to the manufacturer
to attempt to limit its liability by proving an apportionment of plaintiff's
injuries between those caused by the initial collision and those caused in the
second collision by the product defect. Where the injury suffered is indivis-
ible, as in the case of death, paralysis, or any other singular harm, appor-
tionment is deemed impossible and the manufacturer is liable for the entire
extent of plaintiff's injuries.1°6
The court in Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,10 which equated the
Huddell rule with "proving the impossible,"'10 followed closely the Tenth
Circuit's approach in Fox:
[T]he plaintiffs' burden of proof should be deemed satisfied against the
manufacturer if it is shown that the design defect was a substantial factor
in producing damages over and above those which were probably caused
as a result of the original impact or collision. Furthermore, the extent of
the manufacturer's liability depends upon whether or not the injuries
involved are divisible such that the injuries can be clearly separated and
attributed either to the manufacturer or the original tortfeasor. If the
manufacturer's [defective design] is found to be a substantial factor in
causing an indivisible injury such as paraplegia, death, etc., then absent a
reasonable basis to determine which wrongdoer actually caused the harm,
the defendants should be treated as joint and several tortfeasors.1 9
Other courts that have rejected the Huddell approach to proximate causation
in second collision cases similarly have adopted the concurrent tortfeasor
"Iclertain results, by their very nature, are obviously incapable of any logical, reasonable or
practical division. Death is such a result, and so is a broken leg or any single wound, the
destruction of a house by fire, or the sinking of a barge." W. PRossER, supra § 52. at 315
(footnotes omitted).
106. See generally Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 646 P.2d 1020, 1023-
25 (Ct. App. 1982). Fouche presents a general discussion of this approach to Restatement
sections 433A and 433B in the second collision context. The court in Fouche held that the
concurrent tortfeasor doctrine is applicable even in cases where there are not multiple tortfeasors,
as where plaintiff has not sued party who caused the initial collision. Id. at 253, 646 P.2d at
1025. Presumably the court in Fouche would follow this approach even where plaintiff himself
was responsible for the initial collision. Id. at 253-54, 646 P.2d at 1025.
107. 669 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1982).
108. Id. at 1203. See also Products Liability: "Crashworthiness" Doctrine, 29 A.T.L.A. L.
REP. 13, 14 (1986) (after analyzing both approaches, author asserts that the burden of proof
under Huddell would "shipwreck a lawsuit").
109. 669 F.2d at 1206 (citing Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841 (1970)).
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approach to liability and indivisible injuries as articulated by the courts in
Fox and Mitchell."10
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN AUTHORITY: WHY HuDDELL is THE
BETTER REASONED APPROACH
The preceding sections have described the two competing views of a
plaintiff's burden in proving causation between a product defect and an
enhanced injury in second collision or crashworthiness cases. Although both
lines of authority agree that the manufacturer in a second collision case may
be held liable only for the enhancement of injury caused by his product,
there exists profound disagreement over the degree of proof that the plaintiff
is required to demonstrate. One view, initially articulated by the Third Circuit
in Huddell v. Levin, requires that the plaintiff offer proof of which injuries
would have resulted absent the alleged defect in order to establish enhance-
ment. Thus, the plaintiff is required to prove that the alleged defect is the
sole cause of his enhanced injury. The opposing view, as articulated by the
Tenth Circuit in Fox v. Ford Motor Co., requires only that the plaintiff
make a prima facie showing that the alleged defect was a substantial factor
in causing the enhanced injury. If the plaintiff makes this showing, the
burden then shifts to the defendant, now treated as a concurrent tortfeasor,
110. See Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Mo. 1982):
[A] plaintiff's burden of proof in a second collision-strict liability case should be
deemed satisfied against the manufacturer if it is shown that the defective product
was a substantial factor, rather than the sole factor in producing damages over and
above those which were probably caused as a result of the original collision....
If the manufacturer's conduct is found to be a substantial factor in causing an
indivisible injury such as paraplegia, quadriplegia, death, etc., then absent a rational
basis to determine which wrongdoer actually caused the harm, the defendants are
jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's total injuries.
Id. at 83. See also Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1985) (Texas
courts hold that defect need only be "a 'producing cause' of injury" and adhere to "the tenets
of concurrent causation"; thus, "[blecause the defect in a crashworthiness case is viewed as
commingling with other forces to produce a plaintiff's injuries, the entire injury alternatively
could be attributed solely to the defect as a concurrent cause"); General Motors Corp. v.
Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1190 (Ala. 1985) ("[W]here an accident results in an indivisible
injury, such as death, an automobile manufacturer cannot attempt to limit its liability for
proving, or requiring the plaintiff to prove, what portion of plaintiff's injuries is attributable
to the defectiveness of the vehicle it manufactured and what portion is attributable to the
striking driver.").
For additional cases adopting this approach, see Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d
1283, 1288-89 (Okla. 1984); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338,
360 N.W.2d 2, 10-11 (1984); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 646 P.2d 1020,
1024-25 (Ct. App. 1982); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d
490, 494-99 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1130-31
(Wyo. 1978).
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to apportion the injuries between those resulting from the initial collision
and the enhanced injuries attributable to the product defect.'
This section will attempt to resolve this conflict in authority by examining
these divergent approaches in view of the theoretical underpinnings of the
second collision doctrine, as well as the broader themes of tort liability
generally and strict product liability in particular. Such an examination
reveals that the Huddell sole factor approach provides the better reasoned
analysis for the following reasons: (1) the Huddell approach is more consis-
tent with the Larsen doctrine of second collision or crashworthiness liability
because it requires the plaintiffs to prove the existence of an enhanced injury;
(2) this approach is consistent with the broader themes of strict product
liability, i.e., that a manufacturer is not required to design a crash-proof
vehicle, nor to stand as an absolute insurer of its product; (3) the doctrine
of apportionment among concurrent tortfeasors-at the heart of the less
rigorous, substantial factor approach-is doctrinally inapposite as applied
to second collision cases; and (4) the related concept of indivisible injury is
similarly inappropriate, because the very nature of the relief sought-liability
for injury enhancement-contemplates divisibility of the plaintiff's harm.
A. The Huddell Approach is Consistent with the Underlying Doctrine of
Second Collision or Crashworthiness Liability
As discussed above, the second collision or crashworthiness doctrine allows
an injured plaintiff to hold a manufacturer liable for a product defect which
did not cause the plaintiff's accident, but which enhanced or aggravated the
plaintiff's injuries."2 There are two fundamental corollaries of the second
collision doctrine. First, because the allegedly defective product played no
role in causing plaintiff's initial accident, the manufacturer can be held liable
only for enhanced or aggravated injuries that would not have occurred as a
result of the initial collision absent the alleged defect. Second, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving causation between the alleged defect and the
enhanced injury."' The Huddell standard of proximate causation is the
logical extension of these two corollaries.
111. At least one court has expressed its dissatisfaction with both lines of authority. General
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985). The court in Edwards found that
"while both the Huddell and Fox lines of cases have their merits, both also have serious
shortcomings." Id. at 1188. The court applauded Huddell for recognizing, "as the Fox court
did not, that proof of defectiveness also requires proof that a 'safer' practical, alternative
design was available to the manufacturer." Id. at 1189. The court in Edwards, however, rejected
HuddeU's requirement that the plaintiff "prove precisely which of his injuries were caused by
the striking driver and which were caused by the defective design of the defendant manufacturer's
automobile," on the theory that "where two or more tortfeasors act to produce a single
indivisible injury such as death, apportionment is not allowed between the tortfeasors." Id.
(citations omitted).
112. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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The Huddell approach requires the plaintiff to prove that the alleged
defect is the sole cause of his enhanced injury. To do so, the plaintiff must
offer proof of what injuries would have occurred as a result of the initial
collision in the absence of the alleged defect." 4 The substantial factor ap-
proach does not require proof of what plaintiff's injuries would have been
absent the alleged defect." 5 Without such proof, however, there is no basis
for determining that an enhanced injury even exists. In this respect, it is
crucial to recognize that in second collision cases proof of causation and
proof of enhancement are one and the same."'6 Because the product defect
played no role in causing the initial accident, it is only through proving the
existence of an enhanced injury that the plaintiff can establish a causal
relationship between his harm and the manufacturer's product." '
The substantial factor approach allows the plaintiff to proceed without
proof of which injuries were the inevitable result of the initial collision. As
a result, this approach allows the plaintiff to hold the manufacturer liable
without actually establishing that any enhancement of injury occurred; it
allows the plaintiff to hold the manufacturer liable for injuries which in fact
were caused by the initial collision." 8
This result is directly at odds with the fundamental doctrine of second
collision liability.1"9 As the court in Larsen stated:
Any ... defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufac-
turer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be
liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective
design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have
occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design.1n0
The Huddell formulation achieves this result by requiring specific proof of
enhancement.'' The substantial factor approach to proximate causation,
114. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
116. "[Plroof of causation and proof of enhanced injury are inseparable-the injury must
be capable of apportionment or proof of separate proximate cause must fail, and proof of
proximate cause requires definition of the injury." Foland, supra note 5, at 612.
117. See Comment, supra note 101, at 489:
In the second collision case, the basis of the manufacturer's liability is wholly
distinct from that of the... other defendants. Because the manufacturer theoreti-
cally is liable only because he caused or aggravated the plaintiff's injuries, tort
principles suggest that the plaintiff must supply a rational basis for calculating those
specific damages.
118. See supra notes 104-06, 110 and accompanying text.
119. Accord, Ghiardi, supra note 1, at 9 (under Larsen, a manufacturer "is to be held liable
only for those damages resulting from the defective design"); Note, Litigating Enhanced Injury
Cases, supra note 3, at 1259-60 (courts that allow recovery for entire amount when injury is
deemed indivisible have essentially abandoned the original Larsen premise, as opposed to courts
which have "steadfastly honored the parameters of recovery as delineated in-Larsen").
120. 391 F.2d at 503.
121. Thus, the Huddell formulation imposes neither a rigorous addition to normal
proof burdens nor a mechanical approach to proof at trial. On the contrary, the
[Vol. 38:55
19891 THE CRASHWORTHINESS DOCTRINE
which does not require plaintiff to prove which injuries would have been
sustained absent the defect, subjects the manufacturer to liability for the
plaintiff's entire harm, including injuries solely the result of the initial
collision in which its product played no part.1'"
B. The Huddell Approach is More Consistent with the Broader Themes
of Strict Product Liability
The opposing views of proximate causation in the second collision context
reflect a fundamental tension within the developing law of strict product
liability. On one hand, the history of product liability generally has been
one of expansion. From "the fall of the citadel" of privity'23 and the early
opinions of Justice Traynor'24 to the present, the law has steadily eroded the
requirements of proof postulated by the Huddell court merely describe in logical
terms the practical showing that must be made in any design case scaled down
proportionally to fit the peculiar nature of this liability.
Hoenig, supra note 1, at 692-93 n.256.
122. Requiring plaintiff to prove with reasonable certainty the extent of injury enhancement
attributable to the product defect also is consistent with the approach taken in ordinary tort
cases in which plaintiff claims aggravation of a pre-existing injury. Duran v. General Motors
Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779, 787 (Ct. App. 1983). The court in Duran noted that
defendant in such cases is liable only for the injuries it inflicted on the injured party, and is
not responsible for plaintiff's pre-existing condition. Id. The defendant 'is liable only for the
aggravation or acceleration [of plaintiff's injury] and the burden of proving with reasonable
certainty the extent of the aggravation [is] on the plaintiff."' Id. (quoting Hebenstreit v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry Co., 65 N.M. 301, 306, 336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (1959)).
123. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.
791 (1966). Prosser explains that "the date of the fall of the citadel of privity can be fixed
with some certainty. It was May 9, 1960, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced
the decision in Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. [32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)]."
Id. In this case, the court held that privity was immaterial to recovery from a manufacturer of
a defective product, and recognized an implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 793. What
has followed has been "the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established
rule in the entire history of the law of torts. Id. at 793-94.
One commentator noted three major reasons for the shift from liability based on contractual
relations to that of strict liability:
(1) the costs and consequences arising from damaged products could and should
best be borne by the businessmen who make and sell these products because they
have the ability to distribute their losses by price increases or by insurance;
(2) accident prevention could better be promoted by the adoption of strict liability
theories in tort, dropping the necessity of proving negligence; and
(3) the difficult problems of proof in negligence actions, with the attendant cost
of prolonged litigation, would be eliminated.
O'Brien, The History of Products Liability, 62 TuL. L. REv. 313, 322 (1988).
124. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (abandoning requirement of contractual warranties as precedent to recovery
against manufacturer); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing that "a manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled
out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover").
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obstacles to an injured plaintiff's recovery."' On the other hand, courts and
commentators throughout have been unanimous in stating that strict liability
is not the equivalent, in function or in theory, of absolute liability, and that
the manufacturer must not be held to stand as an insurer of his product. 12 6
Proponents of the substantial factor approach mistakenly argue that this
standard is consistent with strict liability in the broader context because it
eases the injured plaintiff's burden of proof. 27 However, this argument
misperceives the underlying purpose of strict liability. The development of
strict liability in tort meant the development of liability without fault. Strict
liability principles in the product area allowed a plaintiff to proceed against
a manufacturer for injuries resulting from an unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct without requiring the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the
manufacturer. 2  These principles eased the plaintiff's burden of proof by
125. See, e.g., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977) ("The discernible
trend in products liability law has been to increase the duty owed by manufacturers for injuries
caused by their products."). The development of the crashworthiness doctrine is an example
of this trend.
The "crashworthiness doctrine," which is also referred to as the "second collision
doctrine" or the "enhanced injury doctrine," is a recent development in the area
of products liability law, so recent, in fact, that prior to 1968 a case of this nature
would likely have been subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1181 (Ala. 1985).
126. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (although
automobile manufacturer must use "reasonable care" in designing its car, there is "no duty to
design an accident proof or fool-proof vehicle"); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp.
1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (no duty to manufacturer "crash proof" automobile); Baumgardner
v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 751, 756, 522 P.2d 829, 832 (1974) (en banc) (defines
duty of automobile manufacturers after analysis of the Evans and Larson progeny). "Strict
liability is not an absolute liability test. While strict liability has its historical origins in absolute
liability for ultra hazardous activity and implied warranty cases, it has evolved in modern times
within the limits of classic formulation of the rule in the Restatement of Torts. This is a dual
test, which requires the plaintiff to prove both that the defendant manufactured or sold a
defective product and that the product was unreasonably dangerous." Kindregan & Swartz,
The Assault On The Captive Consumer: Emasculating The Common Law Of Torts In The
Name Of Reform, 18 ST. MARY's L.J. 673, 706-07 (1987).
127. In Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 41 Md. App. 501, 398 A.2d 490 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1979), the court characterizes the Huddell approach as prescribing plaintiff's burden
of proving "damages" once liability has been established. Id. at 579, 398 A.2d at 500.
To require the plaintiff, in this manufacturing defect case, to prove how, and how
much, he would have been injured "but for" the defect in the manufacturer's
product, simply denies the application of strict liability to such cases. The very
purpose of strict liability is to ease an injured party's burden of proof where it was
heretofore foreclosingly difficult.
Id. Quite to the contrary, the Huddell formulation articulates plaintiff's burden of proving
injury enhancement or proximate causation, which is a prerequisite to liability. Huddell, 537
F.2d at 737-38.
128. As one commentator notes:
Prior to the adoption of section 402A, persons suing in tort for product-related
injuries usually had to prove that the manufacturer or seller was negligent. One of
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shifting the focus of inquiry to the dangerousness of the product, and away
from the conduct of the manufacturer. ' 9
In asserting this theme of easing the plaintiff's burden of proof, proponents
of the substantial factor approach lose sight of an equally important and
well-accepted theme in strict liability: that of requiring the plaintiff to prove
a causal relationship between the product defect and the harm suffered. 130
Liability without fault never was intended to be construed as liability without
causation. Even absolute liability would not go this far.' 3' The plaintiff must
the primary reasons for the adoption of section 402A was the perceived need to
relieve plaintiffs of some of the burdens of pToving negligence.
Gershonowitz, What Must Cause Injury In Products Liability? 62 ImD. L.J. 701, 702 (1987).
129. The essence of the strict liability conception is that liability may be imposed upon
the manufacturer without the necessity of proving negligence. A claimant need only
demonstrate that at the time it was sold the product was defective, and that the
defect caused injury. Those elements established, the care or lack of care of the
manufacturer is simply irrelevant.
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 734 (3d Cir. 1976).
130. See Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CoRN. L. Rv. 541 (1976); James,
Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. Ray. 44 (1955); Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature And
Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. lu. L.F. 693; Owen, Rethinking The Policies of Strict
Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. Rav. 681 (1980); Shapo, A Representational Theory of
Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability For Product Disappointment, 60
VAND. L. Rav. 1109 (1974); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
131. The closest theory to absolute liability that the common law has known was provided
by the writ known as trespass vi et armis (with force and arms), which originated in the 13th
century. In trespass, any action taken that caused direct and immediate harm gave rise to
liability on the part of the actor. Moreover, unlike a modern products liability claim which
requires that the product be unreasonably dangerous for liability to attach, liability in trespass
was imposed regardless of the actor's culpability. See, e.g., Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593, 102
E.R. 724 (K.B. 1803). Justice Grose, in what has become an oft quoted passage, stated as
follows:
Looking into all the cases from the Year Book in the [21st year of the reign of
Henry VIII down to the latest decision on the subject, I find the principle to be,
that if the injury be done by the act of the party himself at the time, or he be the
immediate cause of it, though it happen accidentally or by misfortune, yet he is
answerable in trespass.
Id. at 600, 102 E.R. at 727 (opinion of Grose, J.). The nature of liability in trespass was
further clarified by Lord Ellenborough in the same case: "If the injurious act be the immediate
result of the force originally applied by the defendant, and the plaintiff be injured by it, it is
the subject of an action in trespass vi et armis by all the cases ancient and modern." Id. at
599, 102 E.R. at 726.
The above passages, however, further demonstrate that, while the writ of trespass generally
meant that a man acted at his own peril, causation remained a necessary element in establishing
a prima facie case, albeit the only element. Cf. O.W. Hot ms, THE CoMMoN LAW 85 (1881)
(summarizing traditional trespass doctrine as articulated in the late 18th and early 19th century
precedents and concluding that "it [was] perfectly settled at common law that 'Not guilty' only
denied the act.").
More importantly, causation was not only required in trespass, it was less easily satisfied
than in other writs which were at least partly based on fault. This derived from the fact that
trespass required that the injury be direct and immediate; if it was not direct, trespass would
not lie. If the injuries were indirect, i.e., consequential, a plaintiff could bring an action on
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still prove causation even where he no longer needs to prove culpability.
The Huddell standard is consistent with the doctrinal foundations of strict
liability in tort for manufacturers of defective products. On the one hand,
it allows a plaintiff to recover fully for second collision injuries resulting
from a product defect, even where the product played no role in causing
the initial injury. Yet it also requires the plaintiff to establish causation
between the claimed product defect and the enhanced injury the plaintiff
has alleged. This causation is established when the plaintiff proves the
existence of an enhanced injury, which plaintiff can accomplish only by
introducing evidence of what the initial collision injuries would have been
absent the defect.' 32
The substantial factor approach, which does not require proof of what
plaintiff's injuries would have been absent the defect, does not require actual
proof of injury enhancement. Because enhancement is the equivalent of
causation in second collision cases, 33 the plaintiff under a substantial factor
approach is relieved of the burden of proving a causal relationship between
a product defect and the injury incurred. By effectively removing the element
of causation from plaintiff's case, the substantial factor approach leads to
the imposition of absolute, rather than strict, liability. Contrary to the
established tenets of strict liability, 34 the manufacturer is required to stand
as an insurer of its product. 33
One wholly inappropriate consequence of holding the manufacturer as an
insurer of its product is the complete removal of the plaintiff's conduct from
the case, but would also have to prove fault in the part of the defendant. See, e.g., Scott v.
Shepherd, 2 Black W. 892, 894-96, 96 E.R.. 525, 526-27 (K.B. 1772) (opinion of Blackstone,
J.) (distinguishing between an action in trespass and an action on the case). Thus, under the
common law writs, when liability was imposed without fault, causation was particularly guarded
rather than eliminated.
132. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
134. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501 (8th Cir. 1968) ("the manu-
facturer has a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances in the design of a product
but is not an insurer that his product is incapable of producing injury").
135. See generally Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1981)
("Larsen did not hold, however, that manufacturers are under a duty to design 'accident proof
or fool-proof' automobiles, nor did it hold that manufacturers are insurers.") (citations omitted);
Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Bright, J., dissenting) ("Manufacturers
are not required to produce automobiles with the 'strength and crash-damage resistance features
of an M-2 army tank."'); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968)
(manufacturer's duty is "to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting
the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision"); Roberts v. May, 41
Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (1978) ("The critical question is whether, under all of the
surrounding circumstances, a manufacturer has created an unreasonable risk of increasing the
harm in the event of the statistically inevitable collision."); Wernimont v. International Harvester
Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981) ("A manufacturer cannot design against all
potential dangers of collision and is only required to take reasonable steps, within the limitations
of cost, technology, and marketability, to design and produce a product that will minimize the
unavoidable dangers."); Hoenig, supra note 1, at 653 n.70 (collecting cases).
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the liability equation. Although strict liability largely removed the defendant's
conduct from consideration-focusing on the qualities of the product itself,
rather than the quality of the manufacturer's behavior-it did not similarly
eradicate consideration of plaintiff's conduct. 3 6 The substantial factor ap-
proach often allows the plaintiff to avoid the consequences of his own
conduct. 37 Particularly in single-vehicle accidents-as where a plaintiff, by
falling asleep or cornering too fast, causes his vehicle to leave the highway-
the substantial factor approach allows a negligent plaintiff who caused his
own accident to sue under the second collision doctrine for enhanced injuries
and yet collect for all his injuries, including those properly attributable to
the initial collision. 38
C. The Doctrine of Apportionment Among Concurrent Tortfeasors is
Theoretically Inappropriate in Second Collision Cases
Courts rejecting the Huddell approach in favor of the substantial factor
standard have based their conclusions on principles of injury apportionment
among concurrent tortfeasors and the indivisible nature of death, paralysis,
and other types of injury. 3 9 Under this approach, if the plaintiff can make
a prima facie showing that a defect in the manufacturer's product was a
substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury, the manufacturer is deemed
a concurrent tortfeasor along with the party who caused the initial collision.
The burden then shifts to the manufacturer to attempt to limit its liability
by proving the proper apportionment of plaintiff's injuries between those
attributable to the initial collision and those caused in the second collision
by the product defect. Where the plaintiff's injury is indivisible, apportion-
136. See Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based On Plaintiffs Conduct, 1%8 UTAH L.
REV. 267; Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption
of the Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972); Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative
Negligence In Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797 (1977); Vargo, The Defenses To Strict
Liability In Tort: A New Vocabulary With An Old Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1978);
Walkowiak, Reconsidering Plaintiffs Fault In Product Liability Litigation: The Proposed
Conscious Design Choice Exception, 33 VAND. L. REv. 651 (1981).
137. One commentator has noted that one situation "in which a plaintiff might elect to
undertake the vigorous task of proving a crashworthy-second collision case ... arises when
... the injured party is contributorily negligent so that recovery is precluded as a matter of
law." Foland, supra note 5, at 602. In this situation, the second collision doctrine "provide[s]
legal redress for otherwise incompensable injuries." Id.
138. See, e.g., Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981) ("mhe
plaintiff should be required to prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the
defective design, particularly in a case such as this, where the wearing of seat belts would have
eliminated most, if not all, of the enhanced injuries resulting from the design defect."); Hoenig,
supra note 1, at 696 n.275 (evidence of plaintiff's failure to wear seat belt is admissible with
respect to "the availability of compensating safety devices and the nondefectiveness of the
vehicle as an integrated whole ... mitigation of second collision injures, ... misuse and
assumption of risk . . .and proximate cause").
139. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
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ment is deemed impossible and the manufacturer is held jointly liable for
the entire extent of plaintiff's harm.'14
Given the theoretical underpinnings of crashworthiness liability, however,
the doctrine of apportionment among concurrent tortfeasors is inappropriate
in second collision cases. Placing the burden of apportionment on the
defendant manufacturer as a concurrent tortfeasor mistakenly assumes that
the defendant in fact is a tortfeasor. In this respect, proponents of the
concurrent tortfeasor approach overlook the doctrinal basis for holding a
manufacturer liable in a second collision context. The manufacturer, whose
product played no part in causing the initial accident, is by definition liable
only for injury enhancement, i.e., injuries over and above those that the
plaintiff would have suffered in the collision absent the defect.'14 Thus, the
defendant manufacturer in a second collision case is not a tortfeasor at all
unless the plaintiff has proved some enhancement of injuries.' 4" Put another
way, there is no basis for applying tortfeasor status to the manufacturer in
a second collision case unless the plaintiff is able to show the extent of his
enhanced injuries which are attributable to the defect.'43 It is universally
agreed that the manufacturer in a second collision case has no liability-no
status as a tortfeasor, concurrent or otherwise-unless the plaintiff has
proved the existence of an enhanced injury and a causal relationship between
that injury and the alleged product defect.'"
140. One court has concluded, "In the final analysis, it is over this single issue, the
apportionability of normally unapportionable injuries, that the Huddell line of cases and the
Fox line of cases differ." General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1189 (Ala. 1985)
(citations omitted).
141. See Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 774 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Mhe fact
that [the manufacturer] is liable only for the injuries over and above those that would have
occurred in a crashworthy car convinces us that a rational basis for apportionment exists.");
Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779, 787 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Because
crashworthiness liability is based only on enhanced or additional injuries, the concurrent
tortfeasor concept is not applicable."); Hoenig, supra note 1, at 700-01 n.292 ("Evidence of
enhancement remains the key inquiry and has nothing to do with apportionment or divisibility
of the injury.").
142. The Restatement approach to apportionment among concurrent tortfeasors "requires a
defendant to go forward with proof of apportionment because he is the one who seeks to
relieve himself of liability for all or a portion of the damages. However, in a second collision-
crashworthy case, the defendant has no liability absent proof of enhanced injury. Therefore
the plaintiff is the one who relies on proof of apportionment to establish his cause of action."
Foland, supra note 5, at 615.
143. Wernimont v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 142 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App.
1981). As one commentator argues, "[tlhe manufacturer cannot justly be held responsible for
the injuries the plaintiff sustained if the same or greater harm would have resulted without the
alleged defect or with an alternative design." Note, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases, supra
note 3, at 1268.
144. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
[Tlhe defendant's legal interest in proving that the actual design did not enhance
injuries only becomes manifest after the claimant cogently shows the extent of
injury reduction attributable to his proposed design.
Hoenig, supra note 1, at 706.
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Courts and commentators who would place the burden of injury appor-
tionment on the defendant manufacturer in a second collision case have put
the cart before the horse. There is no basis for requiring the manufacturer
to attempt to limit his liability via apportionment unless the manufacturer
is a concurrent tortfeasor. However, the manufacturer cannot have been
proven a tortfeasor unless the plaintiff has first accomplished that same
apportionment in proving the existence of an enhanced or aggravated injury
attributable to a product defect."45
D. "Indivisible" Injury and the Conceptual Framework of Aggravated
Harm
Applying concurrent tortfeasor principles to a second collision case places
the burden of apportioning plaintiff's harm between first and second collision
injuries on the manufacturer. Courts that have accepted the concurrent
tortfeasor analysis as appropriate in crashworthiness cases also conclude that
this apportionment is not possible where plaintiff's injuries are "indivisible"
in nature.' 4 ' As a result, the defendant manufacturer is held jointly liable
for the entire amount of plaintiff's harm in those cases.
Although the manufacturer's product in a second collision case, by defi-
nition, has not caused the initial collision, under the substantial factor
approach the manufacturer is held liable not only for second collision
injuries, but for injuries properly attributable to the first collision as well.
Such a result is thus flatly inconsistent with the underlying theory of crash-
worthiness or second collision liability."47
The very essence of the second collision or crashworthiness doctrine is
injury enhancement or aggravation-a separate injury or degree of injury
over and above that which plaintiff would have suffered as a result of the
initial collision absent the defect.'" Prior to the development of the second
collision doctrine in Larsen and its progeny, an injured plaintiff had no
recourse against the manufacturer whose product had not caused the initial
accident because courts took the position that accidents were not an intended
use of the manufacturer's product. Recognizing that this view of "intended
use" was too narrow, courts recognized that manufacturers had a duty to
145. This conclusion "is entirely consistent with the Larsen rationale. The essential proof in
any second collision-crashworthy case is that the defective design directly or proximately
caused or exacerbated the injuries beyond what would have been sustained absent the defective
design. The nature of the relief sought contemplates apportionment, and plaintiff must offer
that affirmative evidence. Without [that] affirmative proof the cause [against the manufacturer]
is subject to dismissal as a matter of law." Foland, supra note 5, at 615-16.
146. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. For a particularly strong statement of this
view, see, Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1288-89 (Okla. 1984).
147. Hoenig, supra note 1, at 703. As Hoenig asserts, "[arguments in favor of imposing
the enhancement burden of proof upon the manufacturer rely upon conceptually flawed notions
of dividing up indivisible injuries .. " Id.
148. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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make their products reasonably safe in the event of foreseeable accidents,
i.e., crashworthy, and allowed plaintiffs to pursue a cause of action against
the manufacturer for the enhancement of plaintiff's injuries that resulted
from crashworthiness defects.'4
Thus, the very nature of the relief sought by the plaintiff demands
apportionment or divisibility of the injury sustained. The apportionment
that is contemplated is not a division among the injuries that the plaintiff
sustained, but rather the difference between the injuries actually incurred
and the injuries that would have resulted in the collision in the absence of
the alleged defect.1I °. Where the product defect has not caused the initial
collision, the plaintiff has no cause of action at all against the manufacturer
unless the plaintiff can identify a particular aspect of his injury that would
not have occurred in the ordinary course of the collision absent a specific
defect in the manufacturer's product. Under the theory of the crashworthi-
ness doctrine,' a plaintiff cannot establish the causation element of his case
against the manufacturer absent proof of actual enhancement or aggrava-
tion. '5
Thus, the plaintiff in a second collision case cannot establish liability on
the part of the defendant manufacturer unless the injury is divisible or
capable of apportionment between first and second collision causes.'5 2 There-
fore, it is both illogical and unfair to allow the plaintiff to argue that his
injury is capable of apportionment to establish liability against the manu-
facturer for enhanced injuries, and then argue that the manufacturer should
be held jointly liable for plaintiffs entire harm because the injury, by its
nature, is indivisible.'53
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of crashworthiness or second collision liability is now firmly
embedded in the law of product liability. It extends a product manufacturer's
149. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
150. Hoenig, supra note 1, at 704 n.310. "Since the essence of the claim against the
manufacturer is only the injury over and above what would have occurred with a non defective
design, enhancement is not ascertained by appointment of actual injuries but by evidence of
what would otherwise have occurred." Id.
151. See supra notes 119 and accompanying text.
152. In the average tort case involving multiple causes, each of which is a substantial
factor in bringing about an injury incapable of logical division, every negligent
party is charged with liability for the entire damage. In a second collision-crash-
worthy case, however, such a result has no basis in fact or theory: the manufacturer
neither caused nor contributed to cause the collision and should not, therefore, be
liable for any more than the enhanced injury.
Foland, supra note 5, at 609 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
153. See, e.g., Huddell, 537 F.2d at 739:
It was plaintiff, not G.M., who introduced divisibility into the litigation by arguing
that the accident was survivable but for the defect in the design of the head restraint.
Plaintiff cannot have the argument both ways. Plaintiff may not argue that the
ultimate fact of death is divisible for purposes of establishing G.M.'s liability and
then assert that it is indivisible in order to deny to G.M. the opportunity of limiting
damages.
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liability to situations in which a product defect caused harm, even if the
product was not the originating cause of the plaintiff's accident. Although
the conflict among the Huddell and Fox lines of authority persists as to the
appropriate burden of proof of second collision injuries, the Huddell sole
factor approach must ultimately prevail as the more logical extension of the
crashworthiness doctrine. It is an approach that embodies the two funda-
mental corollaries of crashworthiness liability: that the manufacturer, whose
product played no role in causing the initial accident, can be held liable only
for plaintiff's enhanced injuries, and not for injuries attributable to the
initial collision; and that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving proximate
causation between product defect and injury enhancement. The substantial
factor approach, lost in the conceptually inapposite principles of apportion-
ment among concurrent tortfeasors and of indivisible harm, loses sight of
these two fundamental parameters. The result is liability on the part of the
manufacturer that is no longer strict, but rather absolute.

